Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 13

Number 1

Article 9

2007

The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Dead before It Was Ever
Born
Paul Rynerson

Recommended Citation
Paul Rynerson, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Dead before It Was Ever Born, 13 LAW & BUS. REV.
AM. 183 (2007)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol13/iss1/9

This Comment and Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of
SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE
AMERICAS: DEAD BEFORE IT WAS
EVER BORN
Paul Rynerson *

ESTABLISHMENT

of the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FrAA) will create the world's largest free trade area (FTA) and
trading group.' The countries within an FTA create reciprocal
agreements to reduce trade barriers. 2 Ratification of the FTAA by the
members will create an area "in which barriers to trade and investment
will be progressively eliminated."'3 The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) has created one prominent example of an FTA; it
encompasses Canada, the United States, and Mexico. 4 The FrAA plans
call for the inclusion of all thirty-four democracies-Cuba is the only country excluded 5 -in the western hemisphere. 6 It will eventually lead to the
existence of a single market "covering over 850 million people and nearly
'7
a third of the world's economic output."

There are many methods that countries use to create barriers to foreign
trade. These methods include tariffs, duties on imported goods to raise
•J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law, 2007;
B.A., University of Texas at Dallas, summa cum laude, 2004.
1. Marie-Claire C. Segger, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Issues and Visions
for the Future InteramericanPerspectives Sustainable Development in the Negotiation of the FTAA, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1118 (2004).
2. Carolita Oliveros, Overview of Latin American and Asian Trade Laws, SK068
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 359, 363 (Mar. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Latin American Trade Laws].
While trade within the FrA is controlled by the agreement, each member still has
the autonomy to determine trade policies with non-FTA members. This is in contrast to a Customs Union where the treaty defines policies for internal trade between members as well as external trade with non-members. An example of a
Customs Union is The Common Market of the Southern Cone-MERCOSUR.
3. Free Trade Area of the Americas - FTAA, Antecedents to the FTAA Process,http:/
www.ftaa-alca.org/View e.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Antecedents].
4. Latin American Trade Laws, supra note 2, at 363, 371.
5. Juan Vega, China's Economic and Political Clout Grows in Latin America at the
Expense of U.S. Interests, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 377, 381 (2005).
6. In alphabetical order, the countries included in the negotiations for the FTAA are:
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America,
Uruguay, Venezuela. Free Trade Area of the Americas - FTAA, Links to FTAA
Countries, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/busfac/clist e.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
7. Segger, supra note 1, at 1118.
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the price of the foreign goods, and subsidies-monetary assistance to
lower the price of domestic goods. 8 Free trade agreements generally attempt to reduce these barriers over time; 9 gradual reduction minimizes
the shock that could occur to a countries economy if all barriers were
simultaneously removed.
Open trade within these areas is not absolute; the parties negotiate exceptions into the agreements. One example is a national security exception-allowing countries to restrict arms purchases to internal companies
rather than form dependencies on foreign suppliers. 10 Countries can also
specify minimum amounts under which transactions are not subject to the
agreement. This exception is exemplified in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) government procurement plan-government purchases for
less than a fixed amount do not require equal access between foreign and
domestic companies. 1
I.

GOALS OF THE FTAA

While the main goal of the FTAA is the increase of free trade among
the member states, the Declaration of Principles makes it clear that promoting social and political progress throughout the hemisphere is also
critical. The Declaration of Principles emphasizes that member nations
"share a fervent commitment to democratic practices, economic integration, and social justice. '12 The stated goals in the Declaration of Principles are (1) "[t]o [p]reserve and [s]trengthen the [c]ommunity of
[d]emocracies of the Americas," (2) "[t]o [p]romote [p]rosperity
[t]hrough [e]conomic [i]ntegration and [f]ree [t]rade," (3) "[t]o
[e]radicate [p]overty [a]nd [d]iscrimination [i]n [olur [h]emisphere," and
(4) "[t]o [gluarantee [s]ustainable [d]evelopment and [c]onserve [o]ur
3
[n]atural [e]nvironment for [fluture [g]enerations.'
A.

To

PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACIES WITHIN
THE AMERICAS

The principles declare "that representative democracy is indispensable
for the stability, peace and development of the region.' 4 The principles
champion representative democracy as the only political system that:
"guarantees respect for human rights and the rule of law," protects diversity and the interests and rights of minority groups, and safeguards peace
8. Latin American Trade Laws, supra note 2, at 363.

9. Id.
10. World Trade Organization, Government Procurement: The PlurilateralAgreement,

http://www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/gproc-e/overe.htm
2006).

(last visited Mar. 23,

11. Id.
12. First Summit of the Americas, Miami, Fla., Dec. 9-11, 1994, Declaration of Principles, available at http://www.summit-americas.org/miamidec.htm (last visited Feb.
9, 2006) [hereinafter Miami Principles].

13. Id.
14. Id.

THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS

2007]

185

a commitment to preamong nations. 15 The principles therefore declare
16
serving and strengthening democratic systems.
To encourage democracy, the principles call for public participation in
the FTAA decision making process. The principles invite feedback from
"the private sector, labor, political parties, academic institutions and
other non-governmental actors and organizations in both our national
and regional efforts."'1 7 Allowing participation will also increase public
acceptance of and commitment to the FTAA18 and "strengthen[ ] the partnership between governments and society."
B.

To

PROMOTE PROSPERITY THROUGH ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
AND FREE TRADE

According to the principles, maximizing prosperity will require two
things to occur-restrictions to market access must be eliminated or
greatly reduced and cross-border investment must be increased. Elimination of restrictions means the removal of mechanisms that would provide
domestic products with an artificial competitive advantage over foreign
products. 19 This artificial advantage would create inefficiency in the market by preventing the market from finding and utilizing legitimate actual
or comparative advantages. 20 Mechanisms that would need to be reviewed and1 potentially removed include such things as trade barriers and
2
subsidies.
The FTAA will work to increase the flow of productive investment between member states. 22 The declaration of principles considers investment to be "the main engine for growth in the Hemisphere. '23 To
encourage cross-border investment, the FTAA is tasked with building
more open and integrated markets. 24 This will be done through strengthening tools that "protect the flow of productive investment" and promoting the development and integration of capital markets. 25 The members
also believe that participation in the free trade agreement will result in
15. Id.

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
The WTO calls for the equal treatment of foreign and domestic goods, services,
trademarks, copyrights, and patents. This principle of equal treatment is referred
to as national treatment. World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO:
Principles of the Trading System, http://www.wto.org/English/thewto-e/whatise/

tif e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
20. "A country is said to have a comparative advantage in the production of a good ...
if it can produce cloth at a lower opportunity cost than another country." See The
International Economics Study Center, The Theory of Comparative Advantage,

21.
22.
23.
24.

http://internationalecon.com/vl.0/ch40/4c0OO.html (discussion on the economic
theories of actual and comparative advantage) (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
Miami Principles, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.

25.

Id.
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increased confidence in the economic stability of members.2 6 This increased economic confidence will reduce perceived risk and increase the
influx of foreign investment.
To coincide with the new opportunities for trade, the FTAA will create
a hemispheric infrastructure to increase capacity for trade among the
member states. 27 Financing this new infrastructure will require cooperation with both private and international financial institutions. 28 The infrastructure will utilize telecommunications, energy, and transportation to
"permit the efficient movement of goods, services, capital, information
29
and technology" among the members.
Though implementation of this infrastructure will require consideration
of the disparities in the levels of economic development among members,
implementation will foster economic growth and result in an increased
prosperity throughout the FTA.30 This prosperity will translate into an
increase in the standards of living, an improvement in working condi31
tions, and increased protection for the environment.
C.

To

ERADICATE POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION

IN

OUR HEMISPHERE

The principles call for social justice that can only be exhibited when the
benefits of economic growth are shared by all people. 32 FTAA participants commit to improve access to education and health care "and to
eradicate extreme poverty and illiteracy. '33 Democratic stability and economic growth should benefit everyone, "without discrimination by race,
gender, national origin or religious affiliation. '34 There is also a stated
commitment to improving democratic rights for indigenous people and
"[s]trengthening the role of women in all aspects of political, social and
economic life."'35 The practical results of more evenly sharing the economic prosperity will increase the strength and stability of the democratic
36
governments.
D.

To

GUARANTEE

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND CONSERVE

OUR NATURAL ENVIRONMENT FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS

The FTAA principles call for practices that create development that is
environmentally responsible. Claiming that environmentally responsible
development is the only way to sustain social progress and prosperity, the
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.

36. Id.
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FTAA principles require compliance with established international environmental and developmental agreements. 37 Cooperative partnerships
will be created to: "prevent and control pollution;" "protect ecosystems;"
use "resources on a sustainable basis;" and "encourage clean, efficient
and sustainable energy production and use."' 38 The principles also call for
39
conservation in the use of ecosystems and natural resources.
II.

A.

THE HISTORY OF THE FV'AA

THE PREPARATORY PROCESS

1994-1998

Before negotiations to create a hemisphere wide FTA began, there
were extensive preparations to put the resources in place and help shape
expectations. These preparations began at the First Summit of the Americas (First Summit), 40 December 9-11, 1994, and lasted until the formal
launching of negotiations at the Second Summit of the Americas (Second
Summit), 4 1 April 19, 1998.42 There were a total of four ministerial meet43
ings during this phase.
At the First Summit, representatives of the thirty-four countries agreed
to create the FTAA and laid out what were called "cornerstones of the
FTAA process." 44 These cornerstones included: (1) a commitment to a
multilateral approach that was consistent with immediate implementation
of "GATT/WTO and other sub-regional trade agreements; ' 45 (2) creation of sustainable trade liberalization that supports environmental policies and promotes worker rights; 46 (3) striving for open, balanced, and
comprehensive agreements; 47 (4) recognizing the sovereign right of coun37. Id. The principles specifically address the agreements made at the 1992 United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro,
and the 1994 Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island
Developing States, held in Barbados.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. The First Summit of the Americas was held in Miami, Florida. Output from
the Summits of the Americas will often be referenced by the city name, such as the
Miami Declaration of Principles.
41. The Second Summit of the Americas was held in Santiago, Chile. Second Summit
of the Americas, Santiago, Chile, Apr. 18-19, 1998, Mandates of the Second Summit
of the Americas, availableat http://www.summit-americas.org/eng/chilesummit.htm

(last visited Feb. 9. 2006).
42. Id.
43. Antecedents, supra note 3.
44. First Summit of the Americas: Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), http://
www.summit-americas.org/Miami%20Summit/FTAA-English(rev).htm
ited Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Miami Summit].

(last

vis-

45. Id.
46. First Summit of the Americas, Miami, Fla., Dec. 9-11, 1994, Summit of the Americas Plan of Action, available at http://www.summit-americas.org/miamiplan.htm#
CONTENTS.

47. The specified focus area for these agreements is "tariffs and non-tariff barriers
affecting trade in goods and services; agriculture; subsidies; investment; intellectual
property rights; government procurement; technical barriers to trade; safeguards;
rules of origin; antidumping and countervailing duties; sanitary and phytosanitary
standards and procedures; dispute resolution; and competition policy." Id.
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tries to enter into trade agreements, but encouraging member states to
implement the FTAA agreement; 48 and (5) providing technical assistance
'49
to smaller economies to "increase their level of development.
The First Summit also issued an "[i]mmediate [a]ction [a]genda ...to

take the following concrete initial steps" to create the FTAA. 50 This
agenda called for the determination of areas of commonality by existing
national organizations, the initiation by the Organization of American
States (OAS) 51 of comparative studies of existing hemispheric trade
agreements, the review and response by trade ministers to these reports, 52 and the scheduling of future ministerial meetings with OAS
53
assistance.
The First Summit also established a timeline for negotiations. 54 The
negotiations were to show substantial progress by 200055 and to be completed by 2005.56 During the preparatory process, the representatives
also established "working groups to identify and examine existing traderelated measures in each area, with a view to identifying possible approaches to negotiations. ' 57 At the Second Summit, the representatives
recommended their governments initiate the formal negotiations; 58 the
recommendation was followed and negotiations were formally
59
launched.
1. Negotiating Groups of the FTAA
The development of the FTAA is largely done in negotiating groups
that have been tasked with making recommendations on "how to proceed
in the construction of the FTAA" in the groups specific subject matter
area.60 The main output of these groups is the text, for their specific area,
of the draft agreements. 61 The negotiating groups are designed to ensure
"broad geographical participation; ' 62 participants are representatives of
the member states and the chairs rotate among the members approxi48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
OAS is an international charter organization. All thirty-five countries in the western hemisphere have ratified the OAS charter and are members of the organization. The OAS is the sponsoring organization for the Summit of the Americas.
See Organization of American States, About the OAS, http://www.oas.org/main/
main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=../../documents/eng/oasinbrief.asp (last visited Mar. 21,

2006).
52. Summit of the Americas Plan of Action, supra note 46.

53. Miami Summit, supra note 44.
54. Antecedents, supra note 3.

55. Id.
56. Miami Principles, supra note 12.
57. Antecedents, supra note 3.

58. Id.
59. Latin American Trade Laws, supra note 2, at 371.

60. Summit of the Americas Second Ministerial Trade Meeting, Ministerial Declaration of Cartagena (Mar. 21 1996), availableat http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/
Cartagena/Cartagena-e.asp.
61. Antecedents, supra note 3.
62. Id.
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mately every eighteen months.63 Each working group has been asked "to
identify and examine trade-related measures" and to identify "possible
approaches to negotiations in that area."' 64 The preparatory process has
provided "general principles and objectives" to guide these negotiations. 65 The principles require, among other things, that: negotiating
group decisions must be made by consensus, negotiations be transparent
to ensure mutual advantage, negotiating group decisions be made consistent with WTO rules, and special attention should be paid to the needs of
smaller economies to ensure their full participation in the FTAA
process.

66

In regards to the specific subject matter of the groups, there may be
significant overlap, examples include: "agriculture and market access; services and investment; competition policy and subsidies, antidumping and
countervailing duties."'67 This overlap creates a tremendous opportunity
68
for conflict, but Trade Ministers appear to be satisfied with the results.
After the Denver Trade Ministerial Meeting, the groups were reported to
have shared information and made significant progress. 69 The specific
subject matter areas of the negotiating groups are listed below.
a.

Market Access

The primary goal of the Market Access group is to determine ways to
remove limitations on the ability of one member's goods and services to
compete in the domestic market of another member. "Market access is
an umbrella term for a number of measures that a country may use to
restrict imports."'70 The most common restrictions are tariffs or duties on
imported goods, but the restrictions on goods can also come in many
other forms such as "technical standards, antidumping suits, import quotas, import licensing, and variable levies."' 71 The Market Access group
was instructed by the San Jose Ministerial Declaration "to progressively
eliminate, tariffs, and non tariff barriers, as well as other measures with
'72
equivalent effects, which restrict trade between participating countries.
The Market Access group is also responsible for determining the rules
of origin within the FTAA. 73 The group must "develop an efficient and
63. Id.
64. Miami Summit, supra note 44.
65.

Antecedents, supra note 3.

66. Summit of the Americas Fourth Trade Ministerial, Ministerial Declaration of San
Jose (Mar. 19, 1998), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Ministerials/SanJose/

SanJose-e.asp [hereinafter Fourth Trade Ministerial].
Id.
See Miami Summit, supra note 44.
Id.
Global Trade Negotiations Home Page, Center for International Development at
Harvard University, Market Access, Aug. 2003, http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ cidtrade/issues/marketaccess.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Harvard
Market Access].
71. Id.
72. Fourth Trade Ministerial, supra note 66, at annex It.
73. Id.
67.
68.
69.
70.
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transparent system of rules of origin, including nomenclature and certificates of origin, in order to facilitate the exchange of goods, without creating unnecessary obstacles to trade. '7 4 Rules of origin determine which
goods exported from one member country to another will qualify for
75
preferential tariff treatment.
There is a conflict of interest that is inherent in any attempt to increase
market access. While foreign companies want access to the domestic
market, the goal of domestic companies is to protect domestic industry,
which means limiting market access. 7 6 Despite an understanding that
opening access to their markets is a trade off for access to foreign markets, many of the member state's companies are competitors in important
industries and member states are inclined to protect the domestic competitor. 77 This is particularly problematic for developing countries selling
products in developed countries; the developing countries' main exports
are generally agricultural and must compete head to head with domestic
products of developed countries.7 8 This conflict has to be resolved in
such a way as to satisfy countries all along the economic development
spectrum.
b.

Investment

Increasing investment will lead to "gradual improvement in productivity, and eventually will improve human capital, increase wages, and improve a nation's living standards. ' 79 The Investment group will work
"[t]o establish a fair and transparent legal framework to promote[] investment through the creation of a stable and predictable environment
that protects the investor, his investment and related flows, without creating obstacles to investments from outside the hemisphere. ' 80 U.S. Trade
Representative Robert Zoellnick addressed the impact of free trade
agreements on drawing foreign investment into a developing country; he
claimed that investors from the United States and around the world see
free trade agreements, specifically with the United States, as a positive
indicator for a country's economy. 81 The FTAA will ideally both encourage foreign investment and create a framework to better enable it.
74. Id.
75. Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), FTAA Draft Text, Canada's Positions
and Proposals,and Frequently Asked Questions, Nov. 21, 2003, http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/MA-P&P-en.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
76. Michael Pirret, American Labor Unions and Free Trade Agreements: A Strugglefor
Compatibility, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1257, 1272 (2005).
77. Latin American Trade Laws, supra note 2.
78. Pirret, supra note 76, at 1271.
79. Id.
80. Fourth Trade Ministerial, supra note 66, at annex II: Objective by Issue Area:

Investment.
81. U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick, Roundtable with Ecuadorian Media in Quito, Ecuador (June 8, 2004), availableat http://www.ustr.govlassets/Docu-

mentLibrary/Transcripts/2004/June/asset-upload

file7lO_5372.pdf.
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Services

The Services negotiating group was specifically tasked with determining how the FTA would handle services between members. 82 The Services group has a great deal of overlap with the Market Access group,
which concerns not only restrictions on goods, but also restrictions on
services. 83 Methods for restricting services include limiting the number of
foreign suppliers or limiting the number of "transactions a foreign supplier may perform."' 84 Services can include financial services, telecommunications, transport, professional services, cultural services, tourism, and
film production. 85 The Services group is, for example, attempting to enable foreign accounting firms, professional services, to compete directly
with domestic accounting firms for service contracts in the member
country.
d.

Government Procurement

The ministerial declaration directed the Government Procurement negotiating group to determine the approach necessary "to expand access to
the government procurement markets of the IFTAA countries."'86 This is
to be done through the elimination of discrimination within negotiated
areas of the government procurement. 87 The group is to develop a
framework that will provide for "openness and transparency" in the government procurement process. 88 The negotiating group is also to develop
of
a method where suppliers will be provided "impartial and fair review" 89
resolutions.
dispute
any
of
implementation"
complaints and "effective
In order to determine how to approach the problem of expanding access, the Government Procurement negotiating group first performed a
survey of the government procurement practices of existing free trade
agreements. 90 The agreements studied, both bilateral and multilateral,
included WTO, NAF-IA, MERCOSUR, and the bilateral trade agreements of Mexico. 91 The WTO, for example, utilizes a negative list for
products-all products are included in the agreement unless specified in a
list-but a positive list for services-services are only included in the
82. Free Trade Area of the Americas - FTAA, Working Groups, https://www.ftaaalca.org/NGROUPS/WGroups-e.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
83. Harvard Market Access, supra note 70.
84. Id.
85. FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas, Draft Agreement, ch. XVI, FTAA.TNC/
w/133/Rev.3 (Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/

ChapterXVI-e.asp.
86. Fourth Trade Ministerial, supra note 66, at annex II: Objective by Issue Area: Government Procurement.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. This will overlap with the Dispute Settlement Group, but was still listed as an
objective for the Government Procurement Group. Id.
90. Section I: Summary: Comparative Table of Government Procurement Rules in Inte-

gration Agreements in the Americas, http://www.ftaa-alca.orgfWgroups/WGGP/
eng/gpdocl/ gpleb.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
91. Id.
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agreement if they are in the list.92 NAFTA on the other hand takes a
negative list approach to both goods and services. 93 The full negative list
approach obviously makes the NAFTA product and service lists much
more inclusive than that of the WTO. Evaluating the strengths and
weaknesses of these agreements will assist the group in setting goals in
the area of government procurement.
e.

Dispute Settlement

The Dispute Settlement group is tasked with creating a dispute settlement system that can effectively handle the inevitable conflicts that arise
in any trade agreement, much less one of this size. The group is specifically tasked with establishing "a fair, transparent and effective mechanism for dispute settlement among FIAA countries. '94 But the group
was also instructed to establish a dispute settlement system that would
first "promote the use of arbitration and other alternative dispute settlement mechanisms, to solve private trade controversies in the framework
''95
of the FTAA.
The group has also been instructed to create and evaluate "an inventory of dispute settlement procedures and mechanisms included in agreements, treaties and arrangements of integration existing in the
hemisphere and those of the WTO, appending the legal texts."' 96 The
ministerial declaration specifically requires the group to take into account
the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 97-the annex of the WTO agreement that creates an
extensive system for handling disputes among WTO members. 98 By studying other agreements' dispute settlement mechanisms, the FTAA can
avoid what would be serious and time consuming mistakes. 99 For example, one of the primary reasons for the replacement of the GATT agreements-through the establishment of the WTO-was a weak dispute
settlement system that had proved to be inadequate. Under the old
92. Comparative Schedule of Government Procurement Rules in Integration Agreements in the Americas: Chapter II: Scope and National Treatment, http://www.ftaa-

alca.org/Wgroups/WGGP/eng/gpdocl/gpled.htm (last visited Mar 20, 2003).
93. Id.
94. Fourth Trade Ministerial, supra note 66, at annex II: Objective by Issue Area: Dispute Settlement.
95. Id.
96. Free Trade Area of the Americas, Inventory of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms,
Proceduresand Legal Texts Established in Existing Trade and Integration Agreements, Treaties and Arrangements in the Hemisphere and in the WTO, FTAA.ngds/

w/08/Rev.4 (Feb. 7, 2000), http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ngroups/NGDS/publications/
dsw8r4_e.asp#2x.
97. Fourth Trade Ministerial, supra note 66, at annex II: Objective by Issue Area: Dispute Settlement.
98. World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: Understandingon Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes: Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, http://

www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dsu-e.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
99. See DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIs, DisPuTE SETTLEMENT IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1.01 (2nd ed.
2004).
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GATF approach, even the party that lost the dispute could block the implementation of the final decision. This impotence made the dispute settlement system, in essence, worthless.
According to the Third Draft of the FTAA Agreement (Third Draft),
when a settlement cannot be reached in an FTAA dispute a dispute settlement body (Neutral Panel) will be created to decide the matter. 10 0 The
Neutral Panel will issue an initial report in response to the arguments and
submissions of the parties to the dispute. 10 1 This initial report will con10 2
tain a finding of fact and a recommendation for resolution of the facts.
10 3
The Neutral Panel will then distribute a written final report.
The Third Draft also calls for the creation of an appointed Appellate
Body.10 4 Parties to the complaint may appeal any issues of law covered
in the Neutral Panel final report to the Appellate Body.' 0 5 The Appellate Body will then issue a report that either upholds, modifies, or
reverses the legal findings and conclusions of the Neutral Panel's report. 10 6 The decisions made by the Appellate Body are both binding on
the parties to the conflict and unappealable.1 0 7 As previously discussed,
the binding nature of dispute settlement decisions is a crucial lesson
learned from the failure of other trade agreements.
f.

Agriculture

The objectives of the negotiating group on Market Access shall apply
to trade in agricultural products. The Agricultural group's issue area is
largely a subset of the Market Access group's issue area, and the Agricultural group is directed to coordinate with the Market Access group in
several key overlap areas.' 0 8 The ministerial declaration has adopted the
WTO definition of agricultural products and defines them simply as those
"goods referred to in Annex I of the WTO Agriculture Agreement."' 0 9
The major objective of the Agriculture group is to find "trade-distorting
practices for agricultural products" and "bring them under greater discipline."11 0 While given discretion-directed to reduce or discipline-regarding most agricultural trade-distortion mechanisms, the San Jose
declaration does specifically instruct the group to work towards the elimination of "export subsidies affecting trade in agricultural exports in the
100.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Draft Agreement, supra note 85, at ch. XXIII.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Free Trade Area of the Americas Sixth Meeting of Ministers of Trade, Ministerial Declaration Buenos Aires, Argentina, annex I: Instructions to the Negotiating
Groups: Agriculture (Apr. 7, 2001), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ngroups/
PopUp/PopBAAgriculture e.HTM [hereinafter Argentina Agriculture].
109. Fourth Trade Ministerial, supra note 66, at annex II: Objective by Issue Area: Negotiating Group on Agriculture.
110. Id.
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Hemisphere."''
One major issue to be addressed by the Agriculture group is the permissible application of sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) to agricultural products. 112 SPS measures refer to measures "taken to protect
human, animal, and plant life and health from foreign pests, diseases, and
contaminants."'1 13 The stated goal of the group in handling the issue is
"[t]o ensure that sanitary and phytosanitary measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries or a disguised restriction to international
trade."' 1 4 But the challenge is to balance the goal ensuring that these
"strict health and safety regulations are not being used as an excuse for
protecting domestic producers" and the goal of ensuring that consumers
11 5
are only being supplied with food that is safe by national standards.
The group has been directed to work towards "full implementation of the
WTO SPS Agreement.' 1 16 The WTO approach requires that SPS measures will only be applied to the extent that they "achieve the appropriate
level of protection for human, animal or plant life or health" when they
are "based on scientific principles" supported by "sufficient scientific evidence."'1 7 The group must also create "a process1 18of notification and
counter-notification" for permissible SPS measures.
g. Intellectual Property Rights
The negotiating group on intellectual property rights (IPRs) will assess
the current state of intellectual property in the hemisphere and make recommendations to implement appropriate policies in the FTAA. 119 To
achieve this end, the working group will inventory existing "intellectual
property agreements, treaties and arrangements that exist in the Hemisphere, including all international conventions to which countries are parties." 1 20 The group will also compile a list of existing intellectual property
"laws, regulations and enforcement measures" and "identify areas of
commonality and divergence."' 12 ' Another goal is to "[r]ecommend
methods to promote the understanding and effective implementation of
the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of intellectual Property
111. Id.; Argentina Agriculture, supra note 108.

112. Fourth Trade Ministerial, supra note 66, at annex II: Objective by Issue Area: Negotiating Group on Agriculture.
113. U.S. Department of State, Sanitary and PhytosanitaryIssues, http://www.state.gov/
e/eb/ tpp/c10327.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
114. Fourth Trade Ministerial, supra note 66, at annex II: Objective by Issue Area: Negotiating Group on Agriculture.
115. World Trade Organization, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, http://www.wto.

org/English/tratop e/sps-e/sps..e.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
116. Argentina Agriculture, supra note 108.
117. Fourth Trade Ministerial, supra note 66, at annex II: Objective by Issue Area: Negotiating Group on Agriculture.
118. Argentina Agriculture, supra note 108.
119. Ministerial Declaration of Cartagena, supra note 60.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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Rights (TRIPs)."' 12 2 Finally, the group will identify areas in both the administration and enforcement of IPRs where the organization may be
able to provide technical assistance to requesting countries.12 3 The group
is also tasked with ensuring that the FTAA is creating IPRs protection
124
that can handle the implications of emerging technology.
h.

Subsidies, Antidumping, and Countervailing Duties

The negotiating group on subsidies, antidumping, and countervailing
duties recommends methods of reducing these mechanisms and thereby
increasing market access. 125 The FTAA draft agreement adopts the definition of a subsidy in Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the WTO Agreement. 126 Essentially, according to the WTO, a
subsidy is a direct or indirect financial contribution by a government to
an entity within its territory.1 2 7 Dumping occurs when a foreign producer
imports goods into a country at a price that is below the normal value
according to the "ordinary course of trade."'12 8 Anti-dumping measures
define available remedies to domestic parties that are injured when an
imported product is dumped. 129 A countervailing duty is a "duty levied
for the purpose of offsetting any subsidy granted directly or indirectly to
the manufacture, production, or export of any merchandise." 130 All three
of these mechanisms-subsidies, anti-dumping measures, and countervailing duties-are discouraged by the FTAA because they are seen as
contrary to the goal of creating free and open trade.
i.

Competition Policy

The Competition Policy group is designed to recommend ways to prevent "anti-competitive business practices" from undermining the benefits
3
of the trade liberalization that the FTAA is attempting to bring about.' '
More specifically the group is to recommend ways to advance member
creation of a competition policy, through domestic legislation, that prohibits anti-competitive business practices.132 These domestic competition
policies are to proscribe anti-competitive practices in order to promote
"economic efficiency and consumer welfare."'1 33 Within this competition
policy, members may allow monopolies, state enterprises, or both, but
122. Id.

123. Id.
124. Id.

125. Id.
126. Draft Agreement, supra note 85, at ch. XV.
127. World Trade Organization, Anti-Dumping: Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, http://www.wto.org/

english/tratop_e/ adp-e/antidum2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Draft Agreement, supra note 85.

131. Fourth Trade Ministerial, supra note 66, at annex II: Objective by Issue Area: Negotiating Group on Competition Policy.
132. Id.
133. Draft Agreement, supra note 85, ch. XIX.
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they must strive to limit their anti-competitive impact on other members,
and in the case of monopolies must notify any member whose interests
are affected.134 The group is also to identify ways to increase cooperation
135
between member competition policy enforcement organizations.
2. Special Committees/Groups of the FTAA
There have also been three committees or groups that were formed to
36
address issues that impact the work of all of the negotiating groups.'
These committees/groups are the Consultative Group on Smaller Economies, the Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society, and the Joint Government-Private Sector
Committee of Experts on Electronic Commerce (E-Commerce Committee). 137 Finally, "to consider the overall architecture of an FTAA AgreeCommittee of
ment (general and institutional matters)," the Technical
138
Institutional Issues (Technical Committee) was created.
a.

Consultative Group on Smaller Economies

The Consultative Group on Smaller Economies was established to advise all parties on how best to assist and accommodate the inclusion of
the smaller economies.1 3 9 In achieving the above goal, the Consultative
Group will have two functions: (1) to monitor "the FTAA process, keeping under review the concerns and interests of the smaller economies,"
140
and (2) to "make recommendations to address these issues.
On the recommendation of the Consultative Group, the Guidelines or
Directives for the Treatment of the Differences in the Levels of Development and Size of Economies (Guidelines) were adopted. 141 The Guidelines set standards that all FTAA output, objectives, and principles, must
satisfy in order to ensure the accommodation and inclusion of all member
countries. 142 First, the framework must be flexible enough to accommodate the needs of each of the member countries. 143 The output must
"[b]e transparent, simple and easily applicable.' 1 44 The output must be
evaluated on a case by case basis. 1 45 The output must allow for "transi134.

Id.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Antecedents, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
The Consultative Group on Smaller Economies is open to participation by all
members, and the Chair and Vice-Chair has the same succession process as those
of the negotiating groups. Fourth Trade Ministerial, supra note 66.
140. Id.
141. Free Trade Area of the Americas [FTAA], Trade Negotiations Comm., Guidelines
or Directivesfor the Treatment of the Differences in the Levels of Development and
Size of Economies, FTAA.TNC/18 (Nov. 1, 2002), available at http://www.ftaa-

alca.org/TNC/tnl8-e.asp.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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tional measures, which could be supported by technical cooperation programs."'1 46 Closely tied to the transitional measures, the FTAA must
allow for different countries' varied levels of market access and provide
long time periods for compliance.
b.

Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation
of Civil Society

The Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation
of Civil Society was created to increase the transparency of the process of
implementing the FTAA and "to enhance and sustain participation of the
different sectors of civil society."'1 47 This "commitment to the principle of
transparency in the negotiating process"' 148 is designed to encourage "a
greater number of contributions" 149 and "broaden public understanding
50
and support for the FTAA."'
The Committee accepts written contributions concerning trade matters
from interested sectors (such as business and other sectors of production,
labor, environmental, and academic groups, and other sectors of civil societies) of civil society. 15' These contributions are translated into the
FTAA working languages-English and Spanish; directed to the appropriate FTAA entities-a negotiating group or committee; and made pub52
lic on the FTAA website.1
While contributions will be accepted from anyone, there are some basic
requirements for the contributions. 1 53 These requirements include: the
identity of the respondent, be in regard to matters related to the FTAA
process or latest draft agreement, be written in one of the FTAA languages, 54 include the FTAA cover sheet that specifies the FTAA entity
that should receive the contribution, 155 and include an executive sum146. Smaller countries must be given both the assistance and time to transition from old
practices to the FFAA practices. Id.
147. Free Trade Area of the Americas [FFAA], Comm. of Gov't Representatives on
the Participation of Civil Soc'y, Open and Ongoing Invitation to Civil Society in
FTAA ParticipatingCountries, FTAA.soc/15/Rev.5 (Mar. 31, 2004), available at
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/spcommlSOC/INVITATION/SOC15r5_e.asp [hereinafter
FTAA Participating Countries].
148. Free Trade Area of the Americas Fifth Trade Ministerial Meeting, Ministerial Declaration of Toronto,
25 (Nov. 4, 1999), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/

Ministerials/Toronto/Torontoe.asp#SOC [hereinafter Canada Declaration].
149. Free Trade Area of the Americas [FTAA], Trade Negotiations Comm., Guidance
and Instructions to the FTAA Entities, FTAA.TNC/22 (Apr. 10, 2003), available at
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/TNC/tn22-e.asp.

150. Canada Declaration, supra note 148, at 25.
151. Free Trade Area of the Americas - FTAA, Participationof Civil Society, http://
www.ftaa-alca.org/SPCOMMICOMMCSE.ASP (last visited Mar. 20, 1998).

152. Guidance and Instructions to the FTAA Entities, supra note 149.
153. FTAA Participating Countries, supra note 147.
154. The FTAA languages are Spanish, English, French, and Portuguese.

155. The FTAA entities' contribution may be directed to include the nine negotiating
groups on specific issues, the Committee of Government Representatives on the
Participation of Civil Society, the Consultative Group on Smaller Economies, the
Technical Committee, or the FTAA Process-if the contribution is relevant to all
the entities. FTAA Participating Countries, supra note 147.
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56
mary of two pages or less for any contribution longer than five pages.'157
Contributions may be submitted in either electronic or written form.
All contributions and underlying information that are received will be
made public on the FTAA website. 158 The contributions are posted to
the website in two forms; the executive summary is posted in a working
159
language and the entire contribution is posted in the original language.
The Committee, through publication of contributions, achieves the ministerial goal of creating a mechanism for transparency. 160

c.

E-Commerce Committee

The ministers created the E-Commerce Committee "to increase and
16 1
broaden the benefits to be derived from the electronic marketplace.'
This was largely due to "the rapid expansion of Internet usage and electronic commerce. ' 162 The E-Commerce Committee was instructed to
recommend ways to reduce the growing digital divide-the digital divide
refers to the gap between communities with access to technology and
communities without accessi 63-between member countries.164 The topics reviewed by the E-Commerce Committee included the digital divide,
online consumer protection, and governmental use of electronic commerce. 165 In 2002, the Quito Declaration announced the temporary susCommittee, but authorized it to
pension of activities of the E-Commerce 66
necessary.'
deemed
when
be reactivated
d.

Technical Committee

The Technical Committee was created to design the format of the final
FTAA agreement. The Technical Committee's objectives are two-fold.
First, it is to develop "a proposal for an overall architecture of an FTAA
Agreement. '167 Second, the committee must "prepare a template for the
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159.

Guidance and Instructions to the FTAA Entities, supra note 149.

160. FTAA Participating Countries, supra note 147.
161. Fourth Trade Ministerial, supra note 66.
162. Id.
163. See Randy Diamond, Advancing Public Interest PractitionerResearch Skills In Legal Education, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 67, 109 (2005).
164. Argentina Agriculture, supra note 108, at 31.
165. Free Trade Area of the Americas [FTAA], Joint Gov't-Private Sector Comm. of
Gov't Representatives on Elec. Commerce, Third Report with Recommendations,
FTAA.ecoml05 (Nov. 1, 2002), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/SPCOMM/

ecomm5_e.asp.
166. Summit of the Americas Seventh Meeting of the Ministers of Trade, Ministerial
36 (Nov. 1, 2002), available at http://www.ftaaDeclaration Quito, Ecuador,
alca.org/PopUp/PopQuitoEcom-p36e.htm.
167. Free Trade Area of the Americas [FTAA], Technical Comm. on Institutional Issues, Overall Architecture of the FTAA Agreement (General and Institutional Issues), FTAA.tncmin/2001/01 (Feb. 4, 2002), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/
spcommiTCl/tnmin22_e.asp.
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draft chapters."' 68 This template once approved will be used by the negotiating groups to create the agreement chapters for their subject matter
areas.
The Technical Committee was given some minimum requirements to
include in the architecture. The minimum requirements specified five required sections: (1) "General provisions",' 6 9 (2) Transparency, (3) "Treatment of differences in the levels of development and size of economies",
(4) "Costs of Implementing the Agreement", and (5) "Temporary and
70
final provisions.'
The minimum requirements also defined institutions, and their general
responsibilities, necessary to the implementation of the FTAA.171 These
institutions consist of a political body to provide political guidance
throughout the process, an executive body to monitor the progress of development, a technical body to supervise implementation of each chapter,
and an administrative secretariat to be supervised by the executive body
and responsible for providing administrative, logical, and operational
support. 172 The Technical Committee was also directed to consider "any
proposal submitted by the Negotiating Groups regarding the institutional
bodies deemed necessary for the operation of the Dispute Settlement
Mechanism. ' 173 Included in the determination of institutions necessary
to the implementation of the FTAA, the Technical Committee is required
to make proposals for all the necessary administrative support for these
institutions. 17 4 This administrative support includes "the funding mechanisms, the administrative rules and the implications for human
175
resources."
B.

THE NEGOTIATIONS

The Eighth Ministerial Meeting in Miami (Miami Meeting) produced
an abandonment of one of the foundational principles of the negotiation
process. These foundational principles held that the final FTAA agreement would "be balanced, comprehensive, WTO-consistent, and [would]
constitute a single undertaking.' 1 76 Also, negotiations would be transparent and decisions would be made by consensus. 177 The agreement
would "take into account the needs, economic conditions and opportuni168. Guidance and Instructions to the FTAA Entities, supra note 149.

169. Required subdivision of the General Provisions section included: (1) Preamble; (2)
Purposes and objectives of the agreement; (3) Principles; (4) Exceptions; (5) Scope
and coverage of the obligations (relation to federal or unitary states); (6) Relationship between the FTAA and WTO Agreements; and (7) Relationship between
FTAA and other regional integration agreements. Overall Architecture of the
FTAA Agreement (General and Institutional Issues), supra note 167.

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Fourth Trade Ministerial, supra note 66, at T 9.
Id.
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ties of the smaller economies. ' 178 The FTAA would be designed to "coexist with bilateral and sub-regional agreements. '179 Finally, a country
could join individually or as a member of a sub-regional unit.1 80 These
principles were the basis of negotiations until the Miami Meeting produced an about face on the single undertaking principle.
1. Single Comprehensive Approach (Pre-Miami)
The single undertaking principle called for the creation of an FTAA
agreement that was all encompassing and could not be partially ratified. 18 1 With special exceptions made for smaller economies, there would
82
be no FIAA until there was a complete agreement on the full FTAA.
every member
During the negotiations, however, it became clear that not
1 83
country was prepared to liberalize trade to that extent.
Two Track Approach (Post-Miami Compromise)

2.

In response to this unwillingness on the part of some members to implement the full original vision of the FTAA, trade ministers at the Miami
Meeting disregarded the single undertaking principle and proposed a two
track approach to trade liberalization in the FTAA. 184 Instead, the trade
ministers proposed the creation of a mandatory common set track and a
voluntary plurilateral track.' 85
a.

Common Set Track

The Common Set Track sought to create "a common and balanced set
of rights and obligations applicable to all countries.' 86 The common set
of benefits and obligations would be mandatory for all member countries.' 87 Making this common set mandatory requires that all countries
must accept these "more modest levels" of trade liberalization in order to
satisfy the less liberalization ambitious countries.' 8 8 But, though more
modest generally, the common set would be required to establish at least
some level of liberalization in all nine work areas.' 8 9 This would preclude
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Peter F. Allgeier, Deputy, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks at the
Brazil Summit 2004: U.S.-Brazil Relations in Context of the FTAA Negotiations
(Apr. 27, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/USTRDeputy-Speeches/2004/asset upload-filelO9_4408.pdf [hereinafter Allgeier
Remarks].
See Free Trade Area of the Americas Eighth Ministerial Meeting, Ministerial Declaration of Miami (Nov. 20, 2003), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Ministerials/Miami/Miamie.asp [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration of Miami].
See id.
See id.
Allgeier Remarks, supra note 183.

188. Id.

189. Id.
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countries from trying to negotiate the benefit of liberalization in areas
they wanted, but avoid the cost of liberalization in areas they did not. 90
To create this common set, many countries would be required to agree to
less trade liberalization than they desired in order to satisfy the limitations of the less aggressive countries. 19 1
b.

Plurilateral Agreement Track

The Plurilateral Agreement Track called for the creation of a method
whereby member countries could voluntarily negotiate with each other
for "additional obligations and benefits. ' 192 These plurilateral agreements would be sub-agreements within the FTAA and would only 193
be
binding on those member countries that voluntarily agreed to them.
These voluntary agreements could provide, for those countries that were
interested, increased trade-liberalization above and beyond the common
set. 194 A more aggressive approach to trade-liberalization is supported
"by the United States, Canada, Chile and many others" and the plurilateral agreement track would give them the opportunity to achieve it
within the FTAA. 195 Fourteen countries have already indicated a desire
to negotiate liberalization agreements that will exceed the common set in
areas such as "services, investment, market
access for government pro96
curement, and market access for goods."'
3.

Current Status of Negotiations

There have been no announcements indicating that negotiations are
ongoing in over a year; the last such official announcement occurred in
February of 2005. After the Miami Meeting in 2003, there were several
press releases stating that the co-chairs-Brazil and the United Stateswere sponsoring informal meetings to continue negotiations.1 97 These
meetings were described as discussions among member countries to determine "those elements on which there is consensus to include in the
common set."1 98 The final announcement in February stated that another
of these informal meetings would occur in March of 2005, but no an190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Ministerial Declaration of Miami, supra note 184.

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Allgeier Remarks, supra note 183.

196. Id.
197. Press Release, FTAA - Trade Negotiations Committee, Joint Communiqud of
Chairs, FTAA.TNC/com/02 (Mar. 10, 2004), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/
TNC/TNCcom02_e.asp [hereinafter March Press Release] ; Press Release, FTAA
- Trade Negotiations Committee, Joint Communiqu6 of Chairs, FTAA.TNC/com/
05 (May 21, 2004), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/TNCfTNCcom05-e.asp
[hereinafter May Press Release]; Press Release, FTAA - Trade Negotiations Committee, Joint Communiqu6 of Chairs, FTAA.TNC/com/06 (Feb. 24, 2005), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/aNC/TNCcom06_e.asp [February Press Release].
198. Allgeier Remarks, supra note 183.
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nouncement was ever made as to the results or even if it occurred.1 99 The
work of the negotiating groups had already stopped prior to the Miami
Meeting-early in 2003-so
these informal co-chair meetings were the
200
only progress being made.
The only descriptive status of negotiations given after the Miami Meeting was in a press conference given by Deputy U.S. Trade Representative
Peter F. Allgeier. Allgeier claimed that a gap remained "over the link
between the obligations a country undertakes and the benefits it obtains. '20 1 According to Allgeier, the negotiations had broken down over
fundamental differences "regarding agricultural subsidies, services and
protection of intellectual property. '20 2 In order to break the stalemate
the trade ministers must "find a solution that would be acceptable to all
34 countries as a basis for reinitiating negotiations" in all the negotiating
groups. 20 3 After the Allgeier press conference, the only official information released was the less than informative claim that negotiations were
progressing, which was included in the informal meetings
20 4
announcements.
11.

CONCLUSION: WILL THE FTAA EVER
BE IMPLEMENTED?

There are significant factors influencing the implementation of the
FTAA to make its future appear bleak. These factors include both impasses in subject matter areas, such as agricultural subsidies and intellectual property enforcement, and more general concerns, such as satisfying
everyone in such a large group and overcoming international distrust.
Though some may hold out hope that the FTAA will eventually be ratified, it is likely that there will have to be significant headway made on
many, if not all, of these issues before there is any real hope of
ratification.
A.

SUBJECT MATTER AREA CONFLICTS

There is no question that member countries have different ideas about
how the subject matter of some negotiating groups should be handled.
For example, the United States has attempted to remove the subject of
agricultural subsidies from FTAA consideration by taking the position
199. February Press Release, supra note 197.
200. Richard Mills, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Media and Public Affairs,
Press Teleconference Call (Feb. 24, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.ustr.
gov/Document Library/Transcripts/2005/February/Transcript-of__PressTeleconferenceCallwithRichardMillsAssistantUSTradeRepresentative_forMediaPublicAffairs.html) [hereinafter Mills Teleconference].
201. Allgeier Remarks, supra note 183.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. March Press Release, supra note 197; May Press Release, supra note 197; February
Press Release, supra note 197.
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that the subject should be decided in the forum of the WTO. 20 5 On the
other hand, Brazil and Argentina, have refused, in varying degree, to include in the FIFAA "liberalization of services (financial and telecommunication services, among others), government procurement, or intellectual
'20 6
property (patents, to be precise).
1. Intellectual Property
FTAA handling of IPRs is an extremely contentious issue, with more
developed countries pushing for strong mandatory enforcement and less
developed nations pushing for more discretion in enforcing foreign patents within their borders. Though one of the key principles of the FTAA
is that it be WTO compliant, there is also some question as to whether
the FT'AA should enforce the TRIPs. 20 7 Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Richard Mills was asked whether the United States would accept
the FTAA if it did not include a TRIPs enforcement clause. 20 8 While not
directly answering the question, Mills made it clear that, as an important
part of the U.S. 9economy, protection of IPRs is a primary concern for the
20
United States.
More generally, in order to achieve sustainable development, the balance that must be struck in the enforcement of IPRs weighs "the welfare
of innovators, whose efforts deserve compensation, against the welfare of
society at large, which would benefit by having unlimited access to the
innovation. '210 The standard argument for strict enforcement of IPRs is
that failure to do so would deter innovation; people will not invest resources in creating a property to which they will have no rights and gain
no benefits. 2 11 The standard argument against strict enforcement of IPRs
is generally one of social justice-if IPRs are protected, prices are driven
up and poor underdeveloped countries might not be able to afford such
necessary goods as medicine. 2 12 There are also concerns that IPRs as
they currently function would not provide protection for "traditional
knowledge, particularly that of indigenous peoples within the
Americas. "213

2. Agricultural Subsidies
The United States has refused to give up its domestic agricultural subsidies despite the protests of several South American member countries, in
particular those that are also members of MERCOSUR-Brazil, Argen205. Andean Community, Common Foreign Policy/Free Trade Area of the Americas,
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/common/ftaa.htm
(last visited Feb. 20,
2006) [hereinafter Andean Community].
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208.
209.
210.

Fourth Trade Ministerial, supra note 66.
Mills Teleconference, supra note 200.
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Segger, supra note 1, at 1191.
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tina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The United States claims that agricultural
subsidies should be handled through the WTO and not through the
the
FTAA.2 14 One policy reason given by the United States is that
2 15
United States wishes to retain its food production self-sufficiency.
On the other hand, protecting agricultural production, or any industry
for that matter, creates inefficiency.2 16 If, absent the subsidy, a foreign
of
producer can produce the good cheaper, then the most efficient use 217
resources would be to buy the product from the foreign producer.
Also, it is easier for the United States, as opposed to a lesser developed
country, to redirect labor to a high skill production task.2 18 Therefore
as agriculture, should be done by the
low skill production tasks,2 1such
9
lesser developed countries.
B.

GENERAL CONCERNS

Aside from the conflicts over how and to what extent member countries want to liberalize trade in specific subject areas, there are many
more general pressures working to prevent the implementation of the
FTAA. These pressures include all of the common influences that object
to multilateral trade agreements, a distrust of the United States by the
other participants in the FTAA, the availability of other opportunities for
trade partnerships, reduced pressure to complete the FTAA, and also a
change in priorities for the United States.
1.

Problems Inherent in Multilateral Trade Agreements

The FTAA must overcome one problem inherent in every multilateral
agreement, the need to satisfy a large number of parties. This is particularly difficult in the case of the F-AA since one of the key principles is
that all agreements are made by consensus. Requiring that any compromise satisfy every single party makes progress incredibly hard to achieve
when the members are "such a diverse group of countries.12 2 0 The ambitiousness of the trade liberalization-as compared to the more conservative trade liberalization under the WTO-makes it even more difficult to
garner a consensus; difficulty surmounting this factor prompted the attempt to implement the less ambitious common set of benefits and obligations. But, while lowering the standards may slightly increase the
chances of reaching a consensus, it will probably not increase the chances
to the point that it makes it likely.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Andean Community, supra note 205.
Pirret, supra note 76, at 1271.
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Id.
Id.
Allgeier Remarks, supra note 183.

THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS

2007]

2.

Problems Inherent in Trade Liberalization Agreements

The FTAA also must battle problems that are inherent in any trade
liberalization agreement. There is always some amount of domestic political pressure to keep the market protected from outsiders. Both domestic
producers and laborers have a vested interest in decreasing competition.221 This interest compels them to work to keep the market closed to
foreign competitors. 222 This pressure is not enough to completely derail
any hope of a trade liberalization agreement as is evidenced by the numerous agreements in existence and the fact that all the member countries were willing to attempt negotiations for the FTAA. 223 But this
pressure, when coupled with all of the other factors deterring implementation, becomes one more nail in the coffin.
3.

Negative InternationalPerception of the United States or Developed
Countries

It has also been stated that the biggest roadblock to the implementation of the FTAA is the hemispheric perception of the United Statesother countries simply do not trust that the United States will treat them
fairly. There is a hemispheric perception that the United States is a hypocrite when it comes to free trade and is simply looking for a lopsided
outcome to the FIAA.224 The fear is that the agreement will be much
more in line with the United States' agenda than the agenda of any of the
Latin American countries.
There is also concern that developed countries might use social, environmental, or labor provisions of the FTAA to justify protectionist measures-gaining access to less developed foreign markets while still
protecting the domestic market due to a failure to comply with developed
countries' standards. 225 The fear is that the FTAA will become a club in
the hands of the developed countries, used to force the less developed
countries into compliance with heightened labor, environmental, or civil
rights standards. 226 This fear remains "a powerful psychological hurdle"
that must be overcome in order to implement a sustainable FTAA
227
agreement.
There is also a perception by many Latin Americans that the United
States views their nations "as inferior nations that are expected to support U.S. interests, rather than as equal trading partners. '2 28 Many Latin
221.

Latin American Trade Laws, supra note 2.

222. Id.
223. See Ambassador Ross Wilson, U.S. FTAA Negotiator, Chris Padilla, Assistant
U.S. Trade Representative for Public Liason, & Richard Mills, Assistant U.S.
Trade Representative for Public Media Affairs, USTR Press Briefing Miami
FTAA Meetings, (Sep. 17, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
DocumentLibrary/Transcripts/2003/asset-upload-file638_3478.pdf).
224. Vega, supra note 5, at 382.
225. Segger, supra note 1, at 1131.
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Americans also view the U.S. policies as overly intrusive. 229 And, even
though they do not agree with U.S. policies, they fear being forced to
the proceedings either
comply by a superpower that will dominate
230
through manipulation or simply sheer size.
4. Availability of Simpler Alternatives
Another factor that could decrease the likelihood of FTAA ratification
is the availability of simpler alternatives. The WTO has a much lower
level of trade liberalization than member countries were seeking from the
FTAA, but it is still available and it does offer some liberalization as well
as a well established infrastructure.
Also there is the possibility of creating new bilateral or sub-regional
trade agreements. There are many advantages to creating these smaller
trade agreements, not the least of which is that there are simply fewer
people to satisfy. Also, mistrust and fear would not be as significant a
concern because a country would be selecting their own trading partner(s). The negotiations would also be simplified if the trading partner
were selected, at least in part, because their goals for the trade agreement
were similar. Finally, the selection process could take into account the
disparity in levels of economic development and simply not enter into a
trade agreement if that factor was going to be prohibitive. 23 1 While there
would be lost benefits associated with failing to implement the largest
FTA in the world, there appear to be viable alternatives that would provide some of the benefits without all of the costs, especially time and
effort, associated with implementing the FTAA.
Even while working to implement the FTAA, the United States has
been actively working to implement bilateral and sub-regional trade
agreements within the hemisphere. Aside from NAFTA, the United
States has also created DR-CAFTA (Dominican Republic and Central
American Free Trade Agreement) and a U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement. 2 32 It is possible that creating these smaller free trade agreements
may eventually help the feasibility of being able to implement the full
FTAA.2 33 There is already a great deal of commonality among these
agreements. Linking accords and expanding bilateral agreements into
plurilateral ones might not be as difficult as creating a trade agreement
from nothing. 234 But, at this point, that is more a hope than a plan.
5.

The FTAA May No Longer Be a Priorityfor the United States

Another factor that may play a role in preventing implementation of
the FTAA is that the priorities of the United States have clearly shifted.
229. Latin American Trade Laws, supra note 2.
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The country has survived terrorist attack and is now several years into a
war on terror. The main priorities are the war on terror and homeland
security. Though the office of the U.S. Trade Representative has said the
FTAA is still a priority, 235 it has been over a year since there have been
any official announcements. It is possible that there are people somewhere working to implement the FTAA, but missing the deadline and
working through informal meetings have removed it from the public eye,
and the political will may have left with it.
Though the rewards of the FITAA still remain, the costs all seem to
have increased or at the very least remained the same; this scenario
makes implementation any time in the next few years seem unlikely at
best. The members seem as strongly committed to their divisive positions
in subject matter areas. The international opinion of the United States
has not had a pleasant run during the war on terror. Members are being
distracted by the creation of smaller FTA's with increasing regularity.
Lowered public exposure has reduced the impetus for completion of the
FT7AA. Also, while the United States may not have lost interest, there is
no question that there are currently more pressing issues. Maybe no one
of these factors would have been enough to derail the FTAA but it is
likely all of them together will; the FTAA appears to be dead before it
was ever born.
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